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The Battle of Moyland Wood 
The Regina Rifle Regi:ment, 
16-19 February 1945 
D. Gordon Brown 
I\ lthough I have written accounts about the 
r-ln-Day Landings in Normandy and several 
costly battles from the beaches to Falaise, I have 
always been reluctant to write about the tragic 
events at Mayland Wood in Germany. My 
reluctance sterns from the fact that this operation 
was the most traumatic for me personally and, I 
think, for our Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-
Colonel Allan Gregory, DSO, during the fighting 
in Western Europe. I take no pride in telling this 
story because my own performance in the battle 
was inadequate. Further, I don't wish to offend 
anyone by resurrecting memories that might 
better be forgotten, or to reveal information that 
does not reflect favourably on anyone. However, 
battle conditions place intolerable pressures on 
people, with unpredictable results. A hero today 
can fail tomorrow. A great leader last week can 
suffer from battle exhaustion this week. 
Fortunately. the Regina Rifles still had many 
heroes at Mayland Wood. Unfortunately, most of 
them were either killed or wounded. That's why 
the story must be told. 
he situation that prevailed in mid-February 
of 1945 must be recounted if the story of 
Mayland Wood is to be adequately told and the 
heavy casualties explained. The 3rd Canadian 
Infantry Division had been in combat almost 
continuously since the invasion of Normandy on 
6 June 1944. The casualties in eight months of 
fighting had been horrendous. Regiments lacked 
trained and experienced officers and non-
commissioned officers, and many soldiers had 
no battle experience. However. our greatest 
problem was attitude. It was clear to everyone 
that the war was almost over in Europe. The 
Russian and Allied armies were inside the 
borders of Germany. It was only a matter oftime 
before Victory in Europe would be achieved. Our 
combat officers and men had lost their earlier 
drive and determination, feeling quite naturally 
that it would be folly to lose one's life with the 
war's end in sight. Those of us who had been 
with our units in England and since the invasion 
were near exhaustion. Some had been wounded 
once or twice and had returned to battle 
voluntarily, but they too were sick of the horrors 
of war. The gung-ho spirit of 1944 had been 
replaced with caution and apathy. We didn't want 
to take unnecessary risks or to suffer casualties 
through errors, either on our part or on the part 
of higher command. This malaise affected all 
ranks, at least those on the battlefield and 
vulnerable to injury or death. The static warfare 
in Holland from November to February had 
contributed to our lethargy. When, early in 
February, the orders came for the attack into 
Germany, it was with some relief, but with little 
enthusiasm, that we began the final resolution 
ofthewar. 
The Operation 
B ritish and Canadian Forces were to capture the city of Cleve, just a few miles inside the 
German border and near the Rhine River. We 
were to clear the enemy from the area west of 
the Rhine and strike south to link up with the 
Americans who were pushing up from the south. 
An important goal was to find another bridge 
over the Rhine for access to the northern plains 
of Germany. Despite the flooded fields and roads, 
3rd Canadian Division and a couple of British 
Divisions captured the battered city and struck 
south. The 15th Scottish Division advanced 
down a main road and through the villages of 
Bedburg and Calcar. Then they ran into strong 
resistance from a small forest east of the road. 
This was Mayland Wood. A force of German 
paratroops, fighting as regular infantry, stopped 
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the Scots cold. The 7th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade, like other Canadian units, was 
understrength, cautious and lethargic, but had 
a reputation of being highly successful in the 
heavy going. We were ordered to take over from 
the 15th Scottish and to clear Mayland Wood, 
so that the road south would be opened to 
armoured units pushing south. The Regina Rifles 
would attack the north end of the wood and the 
Canadian Scottish would then capture the south 
end. The Winnipeg Rifles would remain in 
reserve. The Regina Rifle Regiment, like other 
3rd Div units, had suffered very heavy casualties, 
but was fortunate to have former second-in-
command, Lieutenant-Colonel Allan Gregory, in 
command. He had served well in Normandy, been 
promoted to command the Queen's Own 
Camerons of Winnipeg (2nd Division) and had 
been wounded near the Seine River in France. 
He had returned to the Johns in October to 
replace our beloved CO, Foster Matheson. The 
latter had been given a well deserved rest and a 
promotion to full Colonel with the task of 
organizing Canada's Occupation Brigade in 
England. Allan Gregory, or "Greg," as I knew him, 
was a competent and hard working officer who 
took his responsibilities very seriously. We were 
also fortunate that Regimental Sergeant-Major 
Wally Edwards was still with us, along with 
senior NCOs in the Quartermaster jobs. We had 
fine Administration Support from QM Earl 
Rouatt, Paymaster Don McDonald, Transport 
Officer Jim Cameron, and Vassar Hall, Admin. 
Company chief. We had lost three Medical 
Officers over the months. Captain Syd Huckvale 
had been seriously wounded in Caen. Captain 
Harry Dickson was killed near Falaise and 
Captain Griffiths transferred after several 
months of great service. He had been replaced 
by another capable MO, Captain Frank Olacke. 
We were still blessed to have Captain Graham 
Jamieson as our dedicated Padre. What we 
lacked were confident, competent company and 
platoon officers, NCOs, and men. There were 
exceptions of course, and some of the original 
D-Day veterans were still going well, despite 
being out once or twice with wounds. We had 
also benefitted from the return of Majors Bob 
Orr, 2 i/c, and Len McGurran, officer 
commanding Baker Company, from Italy. 
Nonetheless, we had lost hundreds of our best 
officers and men since D-Day and we were not 
very happy about continuing a war which seemed 
all but over. 
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Brigade Headquarters had decided that the 
Johns should take a run at the wily and 
courageous German paratroops at 1330 hours 
on 16 February. Able and Charlie Companies 
advanced with Able in the woods on the left and 
Charlie along the fringe of the forest, on the road 
to the right. Able Company, under Major Art 
Gollnick, was stopped by heavy fire in the trees 
and dug in after some casualties. Major Gordon 
Baird and Charlie Company advanced a couple 
of hundred yards or so along the road with no 
resistance. Surprised at the lack of enemy action, 
Baird decided to send a platoon of men into the 
woods on a reconnaissance. To his chagrin, the 
platoon, commanded by Frank Shaugnessy, 
disappeared completely without shots being 
fired. Shortly, however, the balance of the 
Company was fired upon and Baird, realizing 
that he had been duped by the clever paratroops, 
withdrew his remaining troops to the startline 
and dug in. One of the riflemen from 
Shaugnessy's Platoon escaped that night and told 
how the platoon had been surrounded in the 
trees by German soldiers, who simply ordered 
them to surrender. 
Baker Company, under 2 i/ c Captain Doug 
Howat, was sent forward to enter the wood to 
the right of Able Company and to advance as far 
as possible. The Company came under machine 
gun and rifle fire, suffered several casualties and 
dug in among the many dead 15th Scottish 
soldiers scattered throughout the wood. The 
morale of"A" and "B" Companies sagged badly. 
During the night my good friend Al Gregory called 
me to Battalion Headquarters and told me that 
Dog Company, which I commanded, was to 
attack through Baker Company and drive the 
paratroops out. I had been unaware of the extent 
of the losses suffered by the 15th Scottish, so I 
prepared for the attack and briefed my Platoon 
Commanders, feeling that, with the support of 
Able and Baker Companies, we would be 
successful. I wondered a bit, however, how Dog 
Company was supposed to crush a German force 
which had already stopped units of the 15th 
Scottish and three Companies of the Regina 
Rifles. "Ours is not to wonder why; ours is but 
to do or die." 
We went forward in single file with Lieutenant 
Warren "Buzz" Keating's platoon in the lead. I 
and my runner-batman, Frenchy Paulin, went 
with Buzz's platoon. It was a foggy morning but 
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"Sunrays" sunning- The senior officers of the Regina 
Rifle Regiment eryoy the sun a little over a week 
after the Regiment's traumatic battle in Mayland 
Wood. Gordon Brown writes, "It was not a luxurious 
holiday in the Reichswald, but we were due for a 
change, out of range of German shelling, and we 
could relax in our dug-outs and wear berets in place 
of the uncorrifortable helmets. Someone took a 
picture of Colonel Gregory, standing, second-in-
command Major Bob Orr lying on the ground, Major 
Len McGurran sitting against a tree, and me, of 
course, occupying the only chair in sight." 
we must have been under observation, for we 
were shelled heavily en route. We had a number 
of casualties before we reached the woods. When 
we reached Baker Company's position we came 
under machine gun, rifle grenade and rifle fire. 
Our casualties convinced us to hug the ground 
where we found that we were lying among the 
dead bodies of the Scottish units and some of 
our own Baker Company dead. Crawling to Doug 
Howat's slit trench, I learned that the enemy 
controlled a large open space in the woods and 
simply had everyone pinned down. The problem 
was, of course, that as in all fighting in heavily-
wooded areas, the defender has all the 
advantages. He is dug in and camouflaged, while 
the attacker is vulnerable every time he moves. 
A determined force of 200 defenders, in heavy 
woods, can hold off hundreds of attackers who 
simply cannot see their enemy. Just ask veterans 
of the Vietnam war about this problem. 
Buzz Keating had managed to get his platoon 
dug in and I asked the other two platoons to 
take cover wherever they could. Morale had been 
shattered by the sight of so many dead. I was 
appalled by the situation. I tried to advise Al 
Gregory of our plight but, as often happened, 
our radio (wireless) didn't work very well. I sent 
Frenchy Paulin the mile or so back to Battalion 
Headquarters. The little French-Canadian from 
Temiskaming, Ontario carried a written message 
outlining the situation and asking for direction. 
Readers of this account will be wondering 
why we didn't have any tank support and what 
sort of covering fire and artillery plans were used. 
It's too long a story to tell here, but our tank 
units had been badly battered in Normandy and 
anywhere that the Germans had their powerful 
anti-tank guns. The famed 88 mm anti-aircraft 
and anti-tank weapon had been especially 
devastating. Further, it was practically 
impossible for tanks to operate in a heavily-treed 
area like Mayland Wood. Three tanks had been 
assigned to fire their machine guns and cannons 
into the wood from hulldown positions near 
where we had entered the trees. The tank crews 
could not see the enemy positions and could only 
fire wildly in the general direction of the enemy. 
The trees absorbed most of the lead. 
An artillery fire plan had been used in 
support of D Company's attack but, without 
adequate forward observation, the fire was 
inaccurate and shells often exploded against the 
tops of trees, raining shrapnel down on us more 
often than not. With good observation and 
direction the artillery fire could have been 
devastating to the Germans in the wood. 
However, our Forward Observation Officer could 
not be found. 
As I waited in a shallow slit trench for a 
message from Colonel Gregory, I thought about 
those well trained paratroops who kept 
peppering us with bullets. They were probably 
the best troops we had faced, and they were now 
fighting in defence of their homeland. They were 
not wild-eyed nazis like the SS back in France, 
but brighter and just as dedicated. They had been 
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Irifantry of the Regina Rifles awaiting the signal to attack Mayland Wood. 
selected to block our drive south and in 
particular to control the road. Relatively safe 
from tanks and artillery, they could toy with 
vehicles trying to use the road and they could 
destroy large numbers of infantry attacking 
blindly into the forest. They probably did not 
have more than seven or eight hundred men in 
the entire wood, which extended for several 
hundred yards. We were perhaps confronted by 
about 400 soldiers in the northern half of the 
forest, but they had all the tactical advantages, 
were well dug in and could stop a brigade attack. 
They had proved it by destroying some 15th 
Scottish units. There was a natural killing 
ground in the trees; a large open area of 
triangular shape directly in front of us. They had 
placed machine guns along their two sides of 
the triangle, while we were pinned down among 
the dead on our side. We were being invited out 
into the open where we could go nowhere but 
into hell. How could we deal with the situation, 
I wondered? I devised a plan which I felt might 
work. In the late afternoon I was asked to see Al 
Gregory at Battalion Headquarters. 
I walked several hundred yards and found 
my trusty young jeep driver, Arnold Dahlen, who 
drove me the rest of the way. Greg met me with 
a friendly smile and took me into a separate 
room. He said that he had just received further 
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direction from the Brigadier, and that Dog 
Company should attack without delay. I was very 
upset, of course, and tried to explain the futility 
of frittering away one company after another 
while achieving little or nothing. I sounded the 
Colonel out about my alternative plan. We poured 
over the detailed map of the area for a very long 
time, well into the evening, tugging at our 
mustaches the whole time. 
My plan was to make use of tanks on either 
side of the wood, followed by two companies of 
the Johns on one side and two companies from 
the Winnipeg Rifles on the other side. Under 
cover of darkness we could create panic by 
entering the wood well behind the triangular 
killing ground and perhaps split the paratroop 
force in two. They would have to withdraw or 
face annihilation. The tanks would not be 
vulnerable in the darkness and the sound of their 
motors might frighten the enemy. There were no 
enemy tanks in the area and few, if any, anti-
tank guns. It was a rare opportunity for the 
armour to play an effective role. Our troops 
would feel better too about doing a joint tank-
infantry operation, rather than moving alone 
against an enemy that held all the cards. 
After explaining the plan, I calmly told Greg 
that I would refuse to order the men of Dog 
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Company to attack across that killing ground, 
but that if a better plan were adopted, along the 
lines of my proposal, Dog Company would be 
involved. Greg warned me strongly about 
refusing to carry out the plan that had been 
devised by Brigade HQ. He asked me ifl knew 
that I could be court-martialled for refusing a 
lawful order. I said that I was well aware of that 
possibility, but that I would rather face a court-
martial than order my officers and men into a 
hopeless attack. Greg shook his head and smiled 
grimly. "OK, Gord, you've convinced me that we 
must have a new plan, along with an artillery 
barrage or an aerial bombardment. I don't know 
how the Brigadier will take to the idea, but I'll 
let you know. Wish me luck." 
Back at the Dog and Baker positions we were 
still being hammered by rifle grenades, machine 
gun and rifle fire. Able Company was on a higher 
piece of ground about 70 yards to the left, so I 
called Buck Gollnick on the wireless and asked 
him if his boys could fire down on the Germans. 
He explained that Able Company didn't really 
control all of the high ground and that they could 
not help us. It was not a healthy place, Mayland 
Wood! At about midnight the Company 
Commanders were called to an "0" group 
(meeting) at Battalion HQ. Greg took me into a 
separate room before the meeting began. He told 
me in grave tones that both he and I were in 
serious trouble for taking such strong stands 
against the Brigade plan. Greg had argued 
strongly in favour of a new plan but had only 
been able to work out a compromise, better than 
the old plan, but not what we had hoped for. 
Three Companies of the Rifles would be involved 
in an attack at first light, supported by our own 
flame-throwing Bren gun carriers. We would 
withdraw quietly from our present positions 
throughout the night, in groups of 3 or 4 men, 
in order to conceal our change of plan. Baker 
Company would filter out first, followed by Dog 
and then Able. Under cover of darkness and the 
morning fog we would get into the open fields 
and farms to the right of the road as Charlie had 
done two days earlier. In order to achieve 
surprise no preparatory barrage would be fired, 
although shelling behind the German positions 
would continue. At first light Baker would attack 
into the woods and seize 40 or 50 yards of 
ground. Dog Company would then pass through 
Baker and attack the ridge about 100 yards 
further in. Able Company would enter the wood 
and attack the enemy still covering the killing 
ground, hopefully from behind, of course. There 
would be no tanks involved but our Bren gun 
carriers would provide machine gun and flame 
support. There was to be no deviation from the 
plan and following the attack, Greg and I were 
to meet with the Major-General (Divisional 
Commander) and the Brigadier to straighten out 
our differences. 
Greg asked me to accept the new plan, as a 
compromise, and promised all the support 
possible. The problem, from my point of view, 
was that in attacking down only one side of the 
Wood, we would permit the enemy to concentrate 
on stopping Baker Company's entry into the trees 
and to do the same with the subsequent attacks 
by Dog and Able Companies. If the paratroops 
were forced to look after both flanks and their 
rear, we could put them in an untenable position. 
I also felt that it was wrong to assume that three 
tired, dispirited and understrength Companies 
could dislodge a determined force of well dug-in 
Germans, in a heavily wooded area. We had 
already suffered a lot of dead and wounded and 
lost a platoon taken prisoner; while the Germans 
were fighting on their home ground. I expressed 
these concerns to the Colonel but agreed that 
the plan was much better than the old one. I 
said that I hoped that I would be able to 
accompany him, after the attack, to the meeting 
with the Brigadier and the Divisional 
Commander. 
The Attack 
We withdrew from our positions as planned and, I think, we did not reveal to the enemy 
that we were pulling out. There was quite a heavy 
fog that morning and we made our way along 
the right of the highway for 300 yards or more 
to some farm buildings which were to be our 
startline. Baker Company launched its attack 
as planned and penetrated the woods for about 
40 yards before being stopped. They dug in. The 
enemy reacted quickly as we knew they would 
and, although taken by surprise, they met Dog 
Company with heavy resistance. The two forward 
platoons, under Lieutenant Warren Keating and 
Sergeant Hunt Taylor, charged through "B" 
Company's position and toward the ridge in the 
forest, about one hundred yards into the enemy's 
positions. I went in with our third platoon, 
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planning to stay directly behind the two forward 
platoons and consolidating on the ridge with 
them. However, we lost sight of them in the 
darkness of the woods and veered left toward 
the paratroops covering the killing ground. The 
crafty Germans had sensed what was happening 
and had turned their machine guns around 180 
degrees to fire at us as we came in behind them. 
Our reserve platoon was the least experienced 
of the three, and we came under a hail of bullets 
and grenades. Several of our young soldiers fell, 
some killed, some wounded. The rest of us dived 
to the ground and, under cover of the trees, we 
withdrew almost to B Company's forward slit 
trenches. There was a lot of firing going on and 
chaos reigned supreme. The flame-throwing 
carriers tried to enter the fray but only one 
actually got beyond Baker Company, where the 
rough going caused it to throw a track. Sergeant 
Milton Adolph, in charge of the carrier, jumped 
out and grabbed a German paratrooper who was 
behind a large tree, punched him and took his 
rifle. The poor fellow ran right into me and 
became our first prisoner. 
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Far left: Lieutenant Warren 
"Buzz" Keating, "D" Company, 
Regina Rifles, somewhere near 
Nijmegen, Holland, December 
1944. Keating was awarded the 
Military Cross for his actions 
during the Mayland Wood battle. 
Top right: Lieutenant-ColonelA.S. 
Gregory, DSO, commanding Q[ficer 
of the Regina Rifles. 
Bottom right: Sergeant Hunt 
Taylor, Company Sergeant-Major, 
Regina Rifle Regiment. He was 
awarded the Belgian Croix de 
Guerre at the Leopold Canal and 
received a Commander-in-Chiifs 
Certificate for his role as a platoon 
commander at Mayland Wood. 
I could not determine exactly where our two 
forward platoons had gone. There was a lot of 
noise up on the ridge so my runner and I, along 
with Captain Howat of "B" Company, tried to go 
forward. We were met by grenades and bullets, 
escaping death only by crawling on our 
stomachs. It was pointless. Able Company must 
enter the wood as planned and neutralize the 
enemy on the left or the whole thing might fail. 
We didn't know if Buzz Keating and Hunt Taylor 
and their heroic troops were still alive and we 
could not go forward to find out, so Frenchy 
Paulin and I returned to the farm across the road, 
running the gamut of machine gun fire coming 
down the road from the left. We found Able 
Company unable to get across the startline 
because of the heavy fire coming down the road 
from the left. The paratroops defending along 
the killing ground had decided to stop anyone 
from crossing the highway. 
Knowing Keating and Taylor as I did, I could 
not believe that they had been taken prisoner or 
that they had not reached their objective. I ran 
across the road, diving between two German 
bodies to avoid machine gun fire, and checked 
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with Doug Howat and Baker Company. There 
was still no sign of my missing platoons, but 
things had quietened up at the ridge. Was that a 
good sign or a bad one? I returned across the 
road, found my runner and together we decided 
to go back into the trees and try to find the 
platoons. We dashed across the road once more, 
advanced beyond "B" Company and, under fire, 
dived into a small enemy trench under a tree. A 
shell hit the tree above us and we received a heavy 
blast. I felt some blood trickling down my 
forehead and raised my hand to wipe it off. 
Frenchy Paulin thought that I must be badly hurt 
and jumped out to charge forward himself. I 
grabbed him by the ankle and pulled him back. 
A tiny piece of shrapnel had gone through my 
steel helmet and stopped on my forehead. I was 
able to pick it off, but I was exhausted and badly 
shaken. 
In Normandy we had learned that it was 
unwise to have both the company commanders 
and their 2 i/ c's in action together. If they became 
casualties at the same time, the company would 
be leaderless. The same was true for platoon 
commanders and their sergeants. So a system 
was devised under which either the commander 
or his 2 il c remained out of battle, so that the 
other could come in as a replacement, if 
necessary. When Francis Paulin and I reached 
Battalion HQ I briefed Al Gregory and 
recommended that the officers who had been left 
out of battle from "A," "B" and "D" Companies 
be brought in to relieve their buddies. That would 
mean that Captain Dick Roberts would replace 
me, Major Len McGurran would replace Doug 
Howat in "B," and Captain Bill Jansen would 
replace Major Art Gollnick in "A." Platoon 
Sergeants and Lieutenants would replace their 
counterparts. Charlie Company, under Major 
Gordon Baird, was still in reserve. 
I apologized to a very concerned Colonel 
Gregory and asked my buddy, Dick Roberts, to 
get Buzz and Hunt out as soon as possible, 
assuming that they were still functioning. 
Frenchy and I went to "A" Echelon to rest. The 
next morning, who walked into my quarters but 
"Buzz" Keating. I threw my arms around him. 
His platoon and that of Hunt Taylor had suffered 
heavy casualties but had driven the Germans 
off the ridge and had beaten off the 
counterattacks. The paratroop position had 
weakened when Bill Jansen took "A" Company 
in and neutralized the Germans on the left. Baker 
Company had helped Dick Roberts to get through 
to our two platoons. A clean up process had 
begun. 
The north end of Mayland Wood was in our 
hands, but the south end was still controlled by 
the paratroops. The Canadian Scottish had 
attacked the south end during the night but had 
lost one full company and had not been 
successful. They had suffered very heavily. Al 
Gregory called to tell me that he had decided to 
assume full responsibility for what had 
transpired and that I would not attend the 
meeting with the Divisional Commander. 
Although I had not been looking forward to the 
meeting, I was a little disappointed at not being 
there to support Greg. I felt that we were justified 
in refusing to attack unless a major change could 
be made in the plan, and I was convinced that 
subsequent events had simply reinforced that 
belief. In any case, by not attending, it gave me 
time to do something that I felt obliged to do. I 
managed to get through to the headquarters of 
the 15th Scottish Division by phone. A Staff 
Officer answered and I wasted no time in telling 
him what I thought about them leaving their dead 
on the battlefield so long. He acknowledged that 
something should have been done before then, 
but explained that they had lost so many men 
that they didn't have the resources to get the job 
done. He promised to do as much as he could to 
arrange for burial of the dead soon. 
Conclusion 
T he Regina Rifle book written shortly after the war points out that on 19 February, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Gregory "was called to act 
as Brigade Commander, as the Brigadier was 
leaving." That was, of course, the outcome of 
Greg's meeting with the Divisional and Brigade 
Commanders. We had been vindicated in our 
position that Brigade HQ had underestimated 
the strength of the enemy in Mayland Wood. I 
knew the Brigadier well, having met him first in 
Normandy. I had sat with him on a Court Martial 
case in December 1944. He had served with 
distinction on D-Day and in the Normandy 
campaign, and had commanded the Brigade 
since August. He was, no doubt, tired and like 
our Colonel Matheson, earlier, entitled to a well 
deserved rest after months of tension and strain. 
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Major Bob Orr moved up from second-in-
command to act as battalion commander. 
Colonel Al Gregory, acting as Brigade 
Commander organized an entirely new plan of 
attack to be carried out by the Winnipeg Rifles, 
to capture the area of the wood still occupied by 
the enemy. He arranged a blistering fire plan in 
support of the Winnipegs, including heavy 
artillery, anti-tank guns, tanks and aerial 
bombardment. The Winnipegs, with the loss of 
about 105 killed and wounded, were able to 
dislodge the paratroopers and drive them out. 
Our early Regina Rifle history ( 1946) states that 
the Regina Rifle Scout Platoon, entering Mayland 
Village brought back one prisoner of war who 
claimed that the balance of enemy troops had 
withdrawn on the night of 20-21 February. 
Lieutenant Buzz Keating and I visited the 
scene of our struggle in the north end of the 
woods and found many enemy dead. We also 
confirmed that the enemy had indeed controlled 
the killing ground, i.e., the open area in the trees. 
The machine gun sites and slit trenches had 
clearly been set up to encircle any intruders into 
Mayland Wood. 
I returned to command Dog Company in the 
advance to the Hochwald and Odem. Then Greg 
arranged a nice gift for me - a trip to Arras and 
Cambrai in France to spend a week with an RAF 
Mosquito Fighter Squadron. The squadron was 
based at a former German fighter field near Arras 
and was flying in direct support of the Army, 
doing night bombing and other raids designed 
to aid us in advancing into Germany. I was to 
provide the airmen with information about the 
infantry and the nature of the battle on the 
ground, and to learn of some of the problems 
faced by the pilots. I had a wonderful week and 
flew with one of the hottest pilots in the squadron 
on a fly-over of the Vimy Ridge Memorial, hedge-
hopping in France and an upside down view 
above Brussels. I returned to action east of the 
Rhine where the Johns had just captured the 
German city of Emmerich. 
Mayland Wood had caused the Regina Rifle 
Regiment more than 220 men killed or wounded 
in 3 days, ahead of the one-day number of 211 
at the Ancient Abbey of Ardenne in Normandy. 
The Leopold Canal battle resulted in the highest 
casualties suffered by the Reginas in Western 
Europe, about 300 in siX days. Thus, Mayland 
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Wood holds second place in our experience from 
a casualty point of view, and ahead of D-Day, 
Bretteville-l'Orgueilleuse, Caen, Falaise, The 
Seine, The Channel Ports, Nijmegen, North 
Holland and Germany. Mayland Wood is, of 
course, one of our battle honours. It was a victory 
for the Regina Rifles, but a very expensive one, 
under very trying circumstances. Among those 
receiving awards for bravery were Lieutenant 
Keating, a Military Cross and Sergeant Hunt 
Taylor, a Commander-in-Chiefs certificate. There 
were others who also deserved awards, of course, 
but as with life, war can never be considered 
entirely fair. 
Buzz Keating and Hunt Taylor deserved their 
recognition. Buzz lives in BC and Hunt in 
Ontario. They have enjoyed meeting each other 
again at reunions. For them, the topic of 
conversation sometimes centres on Mayland 
Wood! Ironically, about two months after the 
Mayland Wood affair, as a result of command 
changes at the divisional and brigade level, A1 
Gregory found himself in command of 7th 
Brigade and I was commanding the Reginas in 
the absence of Major Bob Orr, 2 i I c, who was 
away on assignment. We were to fight our last 
battle of the war at Leer in Germany on 29 I 30 
April 1945. Greg was pushing me to get on with 
the attack, but I reminded him about too much 
haste at Mayland Wood and we shook hands on 
that. We had gone through a lot together since 6 
June 1944 and had become fast friends. 
Unfortunately, Allan Gregory died of a brain 
tumour in 1955 at the age of 39. He had married 
after the war and had established himself in a 
law firm in Vancouver. He had returned to Europe 
to visit the battlefields in July 1955. I received a 
card from him from Caen, Normandy and I have 
kept it ever since. 
Gordon Brown landed with the Regina 
Rifles in Normandy on the morning of 
D-Day. On 8 June he was promoted to 
command Dog Company. He remained 
with the regiment for the entire campaign 
in Northwest Europe except for two short 
periods when he was wounded. He 
retired at the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel 
and now lives in Red Deer, AB with his 
wife, Jean. 
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